By: Jafar G Bua*
Commander of The Indonesian National Army (TNI-Tentara Nasional Indonesia) General Agus Subiyanto issued instructions to return to using the term Free Papua Organization (OPM) instead of the previous terms, namely Armed Criminal Group (KKB-Kelompok Kriminal Bersenjata) or Terrorist Separatist Group (KST-Kelompok Separatis Teroris), shows a shift in the TNI's narrative, approach and strategy towards the conflict in Papua.
In this article, TNI can also be read as a state. Because the TNI Commander cannot immediately issue instructions without listening to the President's considerations.
From a layman's perspective, the change in the designation of the group which has recently increasingly intensified its attacks on Indonesian ‘assets' shows a ‘lenient attitude' or state recognition of the group.
However, if we use a more comprehensive perspective, we can examine the use of the term Free Papua Organization (OPM) from the following variables;
Change in Communication Strategy: The reuse of the term OPM indicates a change in the communication strategy adopted by the TNI in dealing with the conflict in Papua. By returning to using older terms, the TNI may be trying to return the understanding of the conflict to its historical roots and embrace a broader political framework in dealing with the problem.
Political Confession to OPM: We all did not expect that the case of the loss of East Timor which later became Timor Leste would have a second volume. However, it can be seen that this change in terms has become a kind of recognition of the political problems surrounding the group's existence. The re-election of the term OPM can be considered as recognition from the state of the political aspects surrounding the conflict in Papua. By recognizing the OPM, the state may try to handle the conflict by considering political factors and the independence aspirations fought for by the group.
So, considering that Indonesia has experienced a historical phase in the liberation of East Timor, of course this will be handled more carefully.
Response to International Pressure: External factors also have an influence. This can be read as a response to international pressure on our country regarding handling the conflict in Papua. By using more neutral terms such as OPM rather than KKB or KST, the TNI is trying to reduce concerns or criticism from international parties regarding the handling of the conflict in Papua.
This also shows clearly to the world that the group in Papua is an armed struggle group that wants independence and is undermining the country. In practice, no country in the world will tolerate such an attempted rebellion. And of course, this must be opposed, both on the diplomatic table and on the battlefield.
Potential Impact on Public Perception: Shifts in the use of terms may influence public perceptions of the conflict in Papua. By identifying the opponent as OPM, the TNI may hope to gain broader support from Indonesian society by linking the conflict to an independence agenda that is considered sensitive. Throughout Indonesian history, treason was a counter-state action that was always resolved by means of arms with support from the public, because more or less such upheavals would make their lives difficult. That is why support from the public at large will provide strong legitimacy for the TNI in taking action against the OPM.
So, are these things likely to change the TNI's strategy in resolving the Papua problem? This can be confirmed, even though there is a change in the terms used, this does not change the TNI's military strategy in handling the conflict in Papua. The TNI will most likely continue with more massive military and security operations aimed at suppressing the activities of armed groups in the region.
The conclusion is that the instruction to reuse the term “Free Papua Organization” by the TNI Commander marks a shift in the communication approach to the conflict in Papua, which reflects an attempt to deal with the problem by considering political and international aspects and gaining broader public support. However, the direct impact on conflict dynamics in the field and military strategy still needs to be observed further. ***
- The writer is a Fellow of the Indonesia Broadcasting Journalist Program, Scripps School of Journalism, Ohio University, Athens, United States 2007, Fellow of the Asia Journalism Fellowship, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Institute of Policy Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 2019, and Book Author.
